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I. Introduction
Many current public policy issues both exacerbate, and raise our consciousness
of, the problem of how we account for our complicity in the world's evil.
Pertinent to our purpose in this article are problems raised by the current debate
on health issues. The inclusion of abortion coverage in a national health
insurance plan and the role of the physician in public executions come to mind.
Questions facing religious institutions and conscientious health-care providers in
general, constitute an arena which should convince us of the importance of
understanding the complex matter of lending ourselves to wrong-doing.
These problems, and others like them, accentuate the renewed relevance of
Catholic moral theology's traditional treatment of the concept: cooperationwith-evil doctrine. Despite its relevance, despite the urgency of our
understanding it well, the doctrine of cooperation-with-evil is seldom thoroughly
and satisfactorily explored. Our purpose in this discussion is to show how we
justify blame for complicit acts. First, we frame the doctrine within the broader
picture of complicity and second, we recast some of the conditions of the doctrine
into a more comprehensible framework.
Several factors contribute to confusion about cooperation doctrine. The first
two relate to the more general concept of complicity. One, the notion of the
complicitous act is fraught with ambiguity. What is its nature? we must ask.
What makes such an act culpable? Two, the very nature of the complicit act
dictates that each complicit deed only analogously resembles other such deeds.
For instance, acting as a lookout for a burglary and hiring a killer are both
complicitous acts, but their point of comparison is obscure. Moreover, we have
the important factor of the connection which joins a given complicitous act with
the harm/wrongl to which it contributes. Whatever this connection is, while it
resembles causality, it lacks causality's coherence. For example, the lookout's
connection to a robbery is one of expediting. But we would describe the
connection of the person who hires a killer to the murder as instigation. These
connections, like the acts themselves, are also only analogous to the links present
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in other complicitous acts.
Thus, although we can easily understand the rationale which allows a nurse to
cooperate with an abortion - the case familiar to us from many texts - we have
difficulty expanding the notion to other cases. The precise the nature of the act,
the exact character of the connection between the act and the harm/wrong, make
application of the concept difficult. A clarification of complicity itself will make
cooperation-with-evil doctrine easier to understand.
Cooperation doctrine's third confusion producing factor lies in the similarity of
the doctrine to the principle of double effect. Writers often imply that the two
principles are nearly identical. Such an identification, however, obscures
cooperation doctrine and makes it less understandable. A clearheaded account
requires that proper distinctions be made between the two concepts.
In this article, we hope to shed light on the topic of cooperation-with-evil by
addressing the confusions we have listed. In Section II we lay down the
characterizing features of complicit acts. We also discuss the analogous nature of
complicit acts and its implications. In Section III, we focus on cooperation-withevil doctrine - elucidating its contrast to the double effect principle and by
highlighting certain key concepts which make the doctrine distinctive.

II. A Conceptual Explanation of the Complicitous Offense
I. The Complicitous A ct as "Non- violating" and Incomplete.

Our first objective is to set cooperation-with evil doctrine within the context of
complicity in general. For our purposes here, we discuss complicity as positive
collaboration, that is, as a participative act on the part of an agent who knowingly
and intentionally takes part in a harm/wrong perpetrated by another person.2
Positive collaboration also includes omissions to act when the agent's duty to
.
prevent a harm/wrong clearly exists.
The complicit act has two philosophically interesting features. Complicity is
by its nature incomplete. This means that we can only understand it in
conjunction with the primary offense with which it is allied. Being incomplete
does not in itself connote mitigation of culpability. The complicit act may be less
blameworthy, but not necessarily. Nor does incompleteness imply that the
accomplice's intention is less culpable from a subjective point of view. Thus for
instance, we have Greek tragedy's classic case of complicity. Here Aegisthus'
encouragement of Clytemnestra to murder her husband, Agamemnon, is less
odious than the murder itself. But Aegisthus' influence entails equal guilt, not less.
So too, Clytemnestra may have failed to carry out the deed. But possible
frustration of the act does not affect the subjective culpability of the accomplice's
intention. To deem the complicitous offense as incomplete simply means that we
cannot give an account of Aegisthus' encouragement without Clytemnestra's
killing, or her intended killing, of Agamemnon.
As a corollary of being incomplete, complicitous conduct is "non-violating" in
this precise sense: the conduct in itself violates no norms; its offensiveness resides
solely in the circumstances which associate it to a primary offense. 3 We do not
describe, and then prescribe, specific complicit acts - for instance, hiring a killer,
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providing a weapon, provoking anger, holding the victim down, and on and on.
Such an enumeration would constitute a monumental task beyond the scope of
any system of mortality.

2. The Problem of Analogy and Connection.
Even armed with the notions of non-violation and incompleteness, we still find
complicity to be an ambiguous concept. An important reason for this ambiguity
lies with its analogous character. Complicit acts themselves, and the connections
between these acts and the harm/ wrong they help to produce, have fundamental
characteristics in common. However, their circumstances differ enormously. Yet,
we can only warrant blame for the collaborative act in view of this connection.
The connection itself might ha ve one of a variety of descriptions: the accomplice
might provide the weapon; he might encourage the killer; he might fail to warn
the victim. Conversely, he might control the situation by instigating the offense
and hiring the killer.
In comparison to the primary offender's relatively forthright "causal" link to
harm, the accomplice's connection is convoluted. Consequently, we have
difficulty explaining exactly how widely differing acts can be complicit. We
would be helped if the connection between the act and the harm were as
straightforward a<; causality. We could then describe complicity as those acts
which indirectly "cause" harm. Good reasons exist, however, for hesitating to use
the terminology of causation. The Jewish tradition of "no agency" addreses this
problem. For one thing, the accomplice's act does not, by nature of its being
incomplete, produce harm. For another, if we say the accomplice causes the
harm / wrong, it can only be through the primary agent. We would then have
mitigated the moral accountability of that agent. For this reason, the Jewish
tradition does not recognize "agency", in which one agent acts for another.
According to the Jewish teaching, if Person X is hired by Person Y to kill
someone, Person X, the primary offender, bears sole responsibility. Person Y
cannot cause him to commit murder. Likewise, H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore4
distinguish between complicity and casuality in dealing with accessory liability in
Common Law. They argue that
The general principle of the traditional doctrine [on causation 1is that the free, deliberate
and informed act or omission of a human being, intended to exploit the situation created
by defendant, negatives causal connection (emphasis included).5

The next best solution for defining the required connection is to describe the
general conditions under which the relationship between actions and
harm/wrong result, and under which they are considered culpable. In this way
the connection applies to a broad number of instances. Common Law refers to
"aid" and "influence".6 These terms - to which we might refer as "cause-like"
- suffice to describe cooperation-with-evil as well. They cover the broad and
often ambiguous link between the harm/wrong and the accomplice's
participation.
The problem for complicity then, lies in understanding the nature of the
complicitous act and in explaining the relationship between the harm/wrong and
February, 1995

35

the non-violating, incomplete act which merely contributes to harm/wrong.
With grasp of these notions we can better understand the culpability which
attaches to the act. We can justify blame. This broad picture of complicity
constitutes a context into which we can place cooperation-with-evil doctrine.
Cooperation doctrine comprises a special case of the collaborative complicit
offense. We must now consider it in more detail.

III. Complicity as Cooperation-With-Evil
The problem of complicity has been with us for a very long time. An early
statement regarding the concept appears in the writing of Tertullian when he
admonishes the idol makers:
Nay, you who milke, that they may be able to be worshipped do worship .. . More are
you to them than a priest, since it is by your means they have a priest; your diligence is
their divinity (emphasis in original).1

Clearly Tertullian has a strong conviction about Christians who craft idols and
build temples - theirs is an unacceptable collaboration with idolaters. But his
potent statement fails to provide guidance beyond the specific case because it
lacks a formula by which we could first, determine the conditions which
constitute such an offence (such as we called for above) and second, make a
judgment of guilt in relevantly similar instances. Thomas Aquinas in the twelfth
century provides more guidance and rational structure when he explains the
sinfulness of these same idol makers. 8 Where Tertullian relies upon rhetoric to
make his point, Aquinas makes use of a reasoning strategy. We now call this
structure the doctrine of cooperation-with-evil, and it owes the careful
conceptualization it has today to another theologian, Alphonsus Liguori.9
Aquinas, Liguori and subsequent theologians have developed a formula
determining when the link between an agent, and a wrong to which he
contributes, is culpable.
1. The Description and Framework of Cooperation-with-Evil

We begin by exploring the kind of cases which cooperation-with-evil doctrine
addresses. Cooperation doctrine constitutes a special case of collaborative
complicity. It functions as a conflict-resolving strategy, concerned with situations
in which an agent's collaboration mayor may not be justified. The agent becomes
culpable when he cannot vindicate his collaboration according to the appropriate
conditions.
Admittedly the doctrine owes much of its dynamic to the thinking behind the
principle of double effect. Both address predicaments in which a refusal to have a
connection with a wrong might seriously jeopardize the life or welfare of the
morally conscientious agent or some other person. Cooperation doctrine
however, is analogous to, but distinct from, the principle of double effect. It
applies rather, to cases in which an agent might contribute to, rather than
perform, a proscribed deed. We readily recognize as examples the classic cases of
the nurse who aids in an illicit hysterectomy or the hospital which makes policy
about such surgeries.
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The doctrine's conditions include some, but not all of the criteria, which
govern the principle of double effect. It makes particular use of the notions of
intention and proportionate reasons for performing an act. However, two further
conditions distinguish cooperation doctrine. The first - necessity - pertains to
the degree to which the cooperating agent's act furthers the primary agent's act
(or harm resulting from that act); to what degree the primary offense depends on
the cooperating agent. How indispensable is the seller of guns, for example, to a
murder? The second condition - proximity - addresses the similarity between
the acts of the two agents: how close in description, and in effectiveness for
achieving the objective of the primary offender's act, is the accomplice's act?
Does the nurse's handing instruments to the surgeon, for instance, constitute a
closer kind of participation than the orderly's delivering the patient to the
operating room?

2. The Considerations and Conditions of Cooperation-with-Evil Doctrine.

A. Cooperation in Wrong or Cooperation in Hann?
Before we discuss the conditions of the doctrine, we need to make a point
about the nature of cooperation doctrine which allows us to expand its
applicability. Theologians often describe cooperation-with-evil in terms of the
cooperating agent's relationship to the will of the primary offender. 10 However,
we find this notion difficult to defend consistently. Common sense suggests that
the cooperating agent cannot sway the primary agent's will without the primary
agent's direct awareness. Yet the nurse may never come into contact with the
surgeon who performs the surgery. Furthermore, the surgeon's intention to
perform the surgery gets him to the operating room. Even if once there he finds no
personnel willing to perform the necessary preparatory tasks, the surgeon's will,
or intent, may remain, though frustrated. 11 If the cooperating agent influences
only the primary agent's will, the "cooperation" pertains to the primary
offender's subjective immoral act rather than to an objectively wrong state of
affairs or to the harm which might affect a third party. This idea narrows the
application of cooperation doctrine.
The question of influencing the primary offender's will is complicated, for
example, by the case of Tertullian and the idol makers. We could argue that while
paying homage to their deities is objectively wrong (in the eyes of the Christian
Church), the idol worshipers' act is not subjectively culpable. In that instance, the
idol makers' influence upon the idolaters' wills does not further wrong-doing in
any subjective sense. It simply aids or facilitates an offensive state of affairs.
Edmund Pellegrino,12 raises a more pertinent, and more interesting point, in
applying cooperation doctrine to the obligations of the institutional physician,
piquing thereby the issue of "cooperating-with-harm". His account implies that
we should not limit the doctrine to the cooperating agent's effect on the primary
offender's will, nor to his contribution to wrongdoing. We might well speak
instead of the cooperating agent's contribution to harm. He makes compelling
use of the doctrine to determine the liability of the prison or military physician
whose obligation to his institution conflicts with his obligation to his patient.
'1)0'\
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Here Pellegrino goes beyond the dictates of the natural law to address the
special obligations of the medical profession. He considers the duty of the prison
physician who participates in an execution,13 or the military physician who
declares a soldier fit to return to battle. Unless we understand the debate to be
about the legitimacy of war or capital punishment in these cases, the physician
neither sways the will ofthe primary offender - the institution - to commit, nor
contributes to, wrong-doing. Sending the patient to war or to be executed harms
the patient but does not wrong him. The physician does not influence the will of
the institution so much as contribute to harming the patient. Thus the doctrine
affords us a broader view of complicity when it extends to the cooperating agent's
participation in harming third parties.
B. The Conditions, and Considerations, for Culpable Cooperation with
Harm/Wrong.
The conditions which constitute the doctrine of cooperation-with-evil are
familiar. In considering them therefore, we shall concentrate only on those
aspects ofthe doctrine which are frequently confused with the principle of double
effect. Furthermore, we shall consider the conditions in their positive light. In
other words, though these conditions are often described as justifying
cooperation, we shall examine them insofar as they justify blame. As we have
pointed out, some moralists try to draw an exact parallel between the two
doctrines, while they in fact differ importantly from one another.
i. The nature of the act. The cooperating agent commits a non-violating and
incomplete act. That is, the act is culpable but not because some precept prohibits
it and not because it suffices to produce harm. We can easily see that the
cooperating offense is both non-violating and incomplete. Were this act itself
prohibited and capable of producing harm/wrong, the accomplice would be a
primary offender rather than an accomplice, and we would not need to appeal to
cooperation doctrine to explain its wrongness.
Here we find our first important dissimilarity with the principle of double
effect. Where the double effect principle depends importantly on the "intrinsic
wrongness" of the agent's act,14 that condition becomes irrelevant in cooperation
doctrine. The act itself is wrong only in its circumstances. One factor of its
incompleteness is that its wrongness lies somewhere other than its being
prohibited by a norm. We look to the deed of the primary offender as the source
of liability for the cooperating agent in this sense: the collaborator's act is
(objectivel y) wrong because the primary offender's act is (objectively) wrong. As
non-violating and incomplete, the wrongness ofthe cooperating act itselflies only
in its circumstances. Its wrongness lies somewhere other than its being prohibited
by a norm or its producing harm.
ii. "Formal" and "material" cooperation. The conditions of formal and
material cooperation are likewise familiar to us. This condition more closely
resembles the principle of double effect. An act of cooperation is culpable when
the agent cooperates "formally" with the primary offender. Formal cooperation,
which is always prohibited, consists in the agent's identifying with the will and
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intent of the primary offender.
The cooperating agent is also sometimes culpable when he participates
materially and proximately. Here we have the first appearance of the proximity
condition which distinguishes cooperation doctrine. In this latter case, the agent's
act influences or aids the primary offender though he does not identify with the
will and intent of the primary offender. However, his act might so closely
resemble the primary offense that we would have difficulty in establishing its
being non-violating and incomplete or insufficient to accomplish the harm; we
could neither explain how the cooperating act differs relevantly from the
prohibited act nor how the agent failed to intend the wrong. 15 The more closely
the accomplice's act resembles that of the primary offender, the more likely it is to
be culpable. A high degree of proximity requires that the reason for cooperating
in the harm / wrong be very important.
We agree therefore with Grisez 16 and 0'DonnelJl7 about the meaninglessness
of the distinction between the immediate material act and the primary offense as
illustrated in the case of the assisting surgeon, and we concur that such acts
require no analysis in terms of cooperation doctrine. Because the acts in question
would lack the component of being addenda, they resemble those described in
the law as "conspiracy" in which each participant is a co-agent and equally
culpable. Because they so closely resemble the primary offense, to maintain that
they were indirectly intended would be inconsequential. The question of
justification for cooperation arises then, only in mediate material cooperation
which we could describe as influencing and/ or aiding.
iii. Proportionate reason. We can state the proportionate reasons condition like
this: the cooperating agent's contribution to a primary offense would be culpable
if his reasons for cooperation were disproportionate to the wrong the primary
offender commits or the harm he perpetrates. Because of the non-violating nature
of the cooperating agent's act, this condition governs cooperation doctrine, as we
shall see. Further, the complexity of the proportionate · reasons condition,
together with its resemblance to that found in double effect doctrine, prompt us to
ask these four questions: first, must we become embroiled in the debate over
proportion found in double effect doctrine? Second, does the term
"proportionate" involve us in problems of the weighing of incommensurate
values and other difficulties inherent in consequentialist formulas? Third, what
factors must the agent juggle in establishing proportionality? Fourth, how does
the agent conduct this juggling?
Our first question concerns the proportionalism debate in double effect
doctrine. We find the proportionate reasons condition controversial within that
doctrine because, there, proportionality seems to impact the very nature of moral
reasoning. This impact occurs because the doctrine evaluates an act and
determines whether or not this act does in fact violate a norm. On one
interpretation, if this condition governs double effect doctrine, its moral
reasoning seems to be fundamentally consequentialist. 18
To claim, on the other hand, that this condition governs cooperation doctrine,
does not entangle us in this debate. Proportionate reasons become the focal issue
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in cooperation-with-evil precisely because the cooperating agent performs neither an
"intrinsically" nor "deontologically" bad, (i.e., morally bad) nor prima facie bad,
act. 19 If the cooperating agent's acts were bad in these ways, we would not require
cooperation doctrine to analyze them. The act in question violates no norm nor
value, even on its face. It presents a problem because, while non-violating, it still
involves, through its circumstances, some ambiguous relationship to someone else's
act. Granted the nature of the act, attention focuses on the circumstances surrounding
it.
Our second question deals with the problems of incommensurate values and their
comparison. If we attempt to compare values as a way to evaluate the cooperating
act, we find ourselves implicated in problems inherent in consequentialism. To some
extent, we have here a language problem. The traditional terminology of
"proportion" connotes the activity of quantatively weighing and calculating, etc., of
values or goods. Alternatively, it could suggest finance-type transactions of
exchanging one value or good in fair exchange for another deemed equal in worth.
The problems of determining which criterion of value to use, or how to apply this
criterion to such disparate goods, then faces us. In any sense, we find
commensurability perplexing.20 We cannot compare the quality of life for the
unemployed nurse to the life of the fetus. Other problems seem also to exist in
determining proportion if we understand it quantitatively.
An alternative view of how we arrive at proportionate reasons eliminates these
difficulties. We might regard the question as one demanding - not calculation, such
that the better course of action outweighs its alternatives by some standard of
measurement - but prudence.21 In the first place, we have already established that,
since the cooperating act violates no norm or value, our assessment of it concerns the
circumstances. We might rather express the condition of proportionate reasons like
this: we censure the cooperating act when a prudential judgment, which considers the
disvalue of the primary offense, the situation of the agent and the circumstances
surrounding his contribution to evil, deems the act as inappropriate. The importance
of this articulation lies in the role of prudence for judging between incommensurate
values by reason of the cogent circumstances. Circumstances might justify the
physician's role in declaring a patient fit to return to battle, in Pellegrino's instance.
Prudence evaluates these circumstances.
We may now ask our third question: what factors must prudence juggle in
establishing a proportionate reason? The intricacy and ambiguity of the act itself, and
of its circumstances, make the establishment of a proportionate reason a convoluted
process. The agent must evaluate an act, which though non-violating, somehow
contributes to a moral wrong. The proportionate reason then takes into account the
gravity of the primary offense in relation to the benefit to the cooperating agent.
We judge the benefit itself in light of the necessity and proximity of the agent's
contribution to the primary wrong. That is, the reasons themselves must be graver
and the benefit more substantial, the more necessary is the cooperating agent's
contribution, or the closer is his contribution, to the primary offense. We thus find
ourselves in a labyrinth of considerations, and we need a unified and discriminating
comprehension to deal with it. The ability to unify these disparate issues uniquely
qualifies prudence for the task.
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Our fourth question asks how the agent juggles these factors or how prudence
operates in this situation? Prudence constitutes that ability to grasp as an
integrated whole the intricate components of a situation and make a judgment
about the right thing to do. We ordinarily describe the prudent agent like this:
first, he possesses a keen insight into the value or norm at stake. He then "casts
about from point to point", in the words of Aquinas, among the circumstances of
the concrete situation, in light of the relevant value or norm, to determine the
appropriate action. Thus prudent judgment always occurs within the objective
restraints of the moral tradition, making the judgment "publicly intelligible".22
Furthermore, the agent acts from a position of commitment to these norms and
values. He is a generally virtuous person whose insight into the right thing to do
stems from his devotion to his final end. 23
We attribute the effectiveness of the prudent agent to his aptitude for
circumstances. With his eye - and heart - firmly fixed on the relevant norms
and values, he possesses flair and imagination for determining what to do in the
concrete situation. We might say he describes well: his competence consists in his
ability to thoroughly and sensitively describe situations, taking into account all
and only those circumstances relevant to the case; he manifests a moral awareness
as well as a wide knowledge of human nature. Robert Henle 24 draws the analogy
between prudence and the ability to understand a political cartoon. This apt
analogy emphasizes the importance of the agent's affinity to the context,25 his
grasp of the situation, his familiarity with the setting and his ability to be
imaginative. Ultimately, prudence coordinates the particulars within the broader
picture and says: act like this in these circumstances. What then, does prudence
look like in respect to cooperation-with-evil?
The use of prudence within any casuistic framework - such as the doctrine of
double effect - alters its character. Its use with the doctrine of cooperation-withevil changes it yet more. In the casuistic framework, the first departure from the
ordinary use is this: casuistry requires prudence for determining culpability both
as a teaching and juridical instrument. In other words, we use cooperation
doctrine to distinguish between permissible and impermissible acts, not of
ourselves, but of others. For instance, a medical ethics course might address the
circumstances under which an institutional (prison or military) physician
functions. A confessor or counselor may use the doctrine to determine the degree
of culpability for someone's participation in an illicit act. In both these instances,
the character and virtue of the cooperating agent, as it relates to the prudential
judgment, may not be in question. Rather, the character and virtue ofthe teacher
or judge might be at issue in their exercise of prudence.
Moreover, in casuistic practice, prudence has additional tasks to
perform. Casuistry usually requires that prudence place the act within
the relevant taxonomy of cases. 26 But in cooperation doctrine, while
the primary offense may fall into some such taxonomy, the cooperating act
itself does not. It is a non-violating act. While we have only a given number
of ways to directly violate norms, we have an unlimited number of ways
of indirectly participating in their infringement. In this case, the
prudent agent's keen insight into norms and values functions in a
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peculiar way. The role of prudence is to perceive the connection between the
moral evil, the non-violating act and its circumstances. We usually do not need
such insight for the immediate and blatant offense. Further, the very nature of
casuistic reasoning in these cases means that each situation is only analogous to
the others because so many, and such varied, possibilities for collaboration exist.
The ability of prudence to detect and articulate the ambiguous and analogous
relationship is critical.
Prudence next sorts through the benefit to the agent - a seemingly simple
task. However, the agent must view this benefit in light of the necessity and
proximity of his participation. Determining proportionate reasons, in other
words, means grasping the ambiguous relationship between the primary evil and
the cooperating act, and then juggling the evil of the primary offense and the
benefit to the cooperating agent in light of two other issues - the necessity and
the proximity of his contribution. With the exception ofthe primary evil, all these
issues - the benefit to the agent and the necessity and proximity of his
contribution - plus some others, fall under the rubric of circumstance. Prudence
grasps and evaluates this complex situation. We now turn to the necessity and
proximity of the cooperating agent's action.
iv. Necessity and proximity. The necessity and proximity of the cooperating act
govern the proportionate reasons condition in warranting justification or blame
for an action. The necessity condition tells us what relationship exists between the
acts oftwo or more persons. We have already suggested that the cooperating act
is incomplete. The necessity condition reaffirms this idea but in reverse. In
addition, the term "necessity" suggests a cause-like relationship. It tells us how
much the cooperating agent's act expedites that of the primary offender. The
more necessary the agent's contribution to the primary wrong, the more serious
must be his reasons for cooperating if he is to escape culpability.
The limiting case of the necessity requirement determines whether the wrong
would occur but for the aid of influence of the accomplice. This requirement,
while acknowledging the incompleteness of the cooperating act, supposes that it
constitutes a more or less essential part of the primary offense. We measure
necessity in this case, by degree and circumstance. How much does the primary
offender need the assistance of the cooperating agent? Circumstances often
determine degrees of necessity. For instance, if only one nurse lives in a certain
village, his assistance to any medical procedure is more necessary than that of
nurses in large cities. The agent depends on prudence to consider such
circumstances and to determine the degree of his necessity to the primary offense,
and more importantly, whether his reasons for participating and the degree of
necessity together, outweigh the primary wrong.
We have recently learned of experiments on radiation being carried out upon
unsuspecting victims, by the United States government. 27 If Person X is the sole
record-keeper and corporate memory for the radiation experimentation records,
her reason for not coming forward must be very grave indeed. The occurence or
non-occurence of the concealment of the records depends solely, or heavily, on
her. Other circumstances affect the question of her necessity. To what degree
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would she recognize relevant data? Does her position give her credibility? The
problem ofthe proportionate reasons remains, but Person X's necessity becomes
clearer.
We have greater difficulty conceptualizing proximity. The proximity
condition tells us how much the cooperating agent's act resembles the primary
wrong in achieving its purpose. The more closely his contribution coincides with
the primary wrong, the more serious must be his reasons for cooperating.
Immediate material cooperation constitutes the penultimate case and the
proscribed deed itself, the limiting case. The inconsistencies which result from the
long evolution of the principle of double effect and cooperation doctrine obstruct
our ability to gain a comprehensive and satisfactory grasp of proximity.
We might regard contributions to a proscribed deed as a continuum. Without
prudence, such a view might im ply a certain physicalism by which the act itself,
apart from the human elements of knowledge and intention, possesses not only
moral value, but quantifiable moral value. The prudent agent however, evaluates
his contribution to the wrongful act and the degree to which it approaches the
wrongfulness of the proscribed act itself. Prudence views the act as closer to or
farther from the violating and complete nature of the primary offense. The agent's
reason for participating in the wrong must be greater as his contribution moves
up the scale toward unequivocal wrong-doing. Here again, our operative
concepts fit only approximately, sometimes better, sometimes worse. The
prudent agent is able to unify these approximate and confusing elements of
necessity, proximity and proportionate reasons. Furthermore, he discerns from
their perhaps unique configuration, the proper, and the loving, thing to do.
This description of a moral act indeed seems strange, and like all analogies, this
one clarifies some difficulties while obscuring others. The clerk who admits a
pregnant woman into an abortion clinic plays a more remote role than the
anesthesiologist who assists with the procedure. Proximity in time and place,
which explain the immediacy of the anesthesiologist's contribution, seems to help
explain proximity. This explanation fails though, to account for the case of the
administrator of a group of hospitals who must decide about certain controversial
or ambiguous policy matters. In this case the cooperating agent, the
administrator, might reside in a city at a thousand miles distance and may make
decisions a month in advance.
We can only describe proximity analogously, for we seem to grasp the concept
intuitively rather than conceptually. Each application of proximity constitutes
merely an approximation of a model. The wide variety of situations to which
these conditions must apply, the difficulty in specifying the necessity and
proximity conditions and the commensurability problem which accompanies the
proportionate reasons condition itself, all serve to complicate the doctrine of
cooperation-with-evil.
We have seen that an agent, or a third party, evaluates the agent's contribution
to a wrong by first ascertaining whether the agent joins his intention - formally
- to that of the primary offender in willing the wrong of the offense. Next, his
reasons for participating in the wrong must be evaluated in view ofthe degree to
which his contribution is necessary and the degree to which his contributing act
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approximates the primary offense. The agent must then make the determination
about whether these latter three conditions together are proportionate to the
wrong committed by the primary agent. If any ofthese conditions is not met and
the agent knows his cooperation to be unwarranted, but he chooses to make his
contribution nonethless, blame for collaboration is justified.
Conclusion
Our view of cooperation-with-evil now appears within the general framework
of complicity. An understanding of complicitous acts as incomplete and nonviolating helps us to understand the ambiguity of collaboration in others' wrongdoing. The acts themselves, and the links associating accomplices to the
harm/wrong in which they participate, belong to a kind of family - joined by
analogy. We cannot say that an accomplice causes harm/wrong, but we may
frame his participation as aiding and influencing.
With this new understanding of cooperation-with-evil doctrine as part of the
broader concept of complicity, we must consider the doctrine itself. Although
cooperation doctrine resembles aspects of the principle of double effect, it is
distinct from it. Cooperation doctrine deals with non-violating acts, insufficient
of themselves to produce harm/wrong. The doctrine centers around
proportionate reasons which must be balanced with the necessity and the
proximity of the accomplice's participation. Cooperation doctrine can be
expanded to explain cooperation with harm rather than only with wrong-doing.
With this more in-depth analysis behind us, we approach once again the
possibilities of lending ourselves to wrong-doing in our world. We consider the
problems present in health care, in professional ethics, in public policy, with
sharpened tools for moral diagnosis and for understanding.
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